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THE “WAR ON TERROR” THROUGH BRITISH
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW




To say that public international law in general—and interna-
tional humanitarian law in particular—has been in a state of fer-
ment since the onset of the “War on Terror” in September 2001
would be an understatement.  The early use, by officials of the
United States from the President on down, of rhetoric and termi-
nologies fashioned from the condition of war1—while explicable in
a political context2—has helped spawn a large-scale animated de-
bate about the significance of that language in law.3  That debate
has had both national and international legal aspects.  The latter,
after an initial focus on the legality of the extraterritorial use of
force against terrorist organizations (jus ad bellum),4 has tended to
* Senior Lecturer in International Humanitarian Law, Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom (Cranfield University).  I am indebted to Adam Clark for research
assistance and to Charles Garraway for comments on the original draft of this paper;
any errors or omissions are entirely my own. Views expressed herein are likewise my
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the British Government or Ministry of
Defence.
1 The day after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the President
said, “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our
country were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war.”  President George W.
Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security
Team (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010912-4.html.  The following day, the President issued a Proclamation in which he
described the attacks as “a series of despicable acts of war.”  President George W.
Bush, National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for Victims of the Terrorist Attack
on September 11, 2001, A Proclamation (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html.
2 See Jens Meierhenrich, Analogies at War, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 1 (2006).
3 E.g., Stephen P. Marks, Branding the “War on Terrorism”: Is There a “New Paradigm”
of International Law?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 71, 72 (2006). See also articles cited infra,
notes 14–16.
4 See Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 Septem-
ber, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002); Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military
Force Against Terrorist Attacks, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 341 (2003); Greg Travalio & John
Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97 (2003);
Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating
Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles of Anticipatory
Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87 (2004); Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics:
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concentrate on the application in concreto of the laws of armed con-
flict on extraterritorial military operations against terrorist organi-
zations (jus in bello)5 or—much more frequently—on the use of
human rights law and standards in the detention and treatment of
alleged members of those organizations captured in the aforemen-
tioned military operations.6  At the same time, some have ques-
tioned the very applicability of the international law of armed
conflict (also known as “international humanitarian law”) to such
operations on the grounds that a “war on terrorism,” being a war
primarily of a rhetorical nature akin to the “war on drugs” or the
“war on crime,” calls more for the application of criminal law.7
There is no doubt that some aspects of the prosecution of the “War
on Terror” have been more in the nature of police, rather than
military, operations. Some of these police operations, however,
have acquired a definite military component, thereby blurring the
legal boundaries between police and military operations in the
sense that military forces are deployed to operate in a situation in
which there is no armed conflict.8  Others have accepted that the
Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 141 (2007).
5 E.g., Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan, 7 J. CON-
FLICT & SECURITY L. 37 (2002).
6 E.g., Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons qua Unlawful Combatants?
The Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantánamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, 1 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 284 (2003); Luigi Condorelli & Pasquale De Sena, The Relevance of the Obligations
Flowing from the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to US Courts Dealing with Guan-
tánamo Detainees, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 107 (2004); George P. Fletcher, Black Hole in
Guantánamo Bay, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.  121 (2004); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and
Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detain-
ees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.  811 (2004–2005); James G.  Stewart, Rethinking Guan-
tánamo: Unlawful Confinement as Applied in International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 12 (2006).
7 According to a legal adviser in the International Committee of the Red Cross,
The counter-terrorist effort is being carried out by a variety of means,
including law enforcement, intelligence gathering, police and judicial
cooperation, extradition, financial investigations, the freezing of assets,
diplomatic démarches and criminal sanctions.  ‘Terrorism’ is a phenom-
enon.  Both practically and as a matter of law, war cannot be waged
against a phenomenon.
Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?, 75 BRITISH Y. B.
INT’L L.  71 (2004), 87–88.
8 An example of this may be found in “Operation Active Endeavour,” imple-
mented after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty in collective self-defense against terrorism.  “Operation Active En-
deavour” is executed by the Allied Joint Force Command Naples; since April 2003
they have been boarding ships and checking manifests against actual cargoes carried.
Operation Active Endeavour, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, http://www.
afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm (last visited
July 14, 2007).
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law of armed conflict is appropriate, but have called for its reform
on the basis that it is outmoded, “obsolete,” “quaint,” and inappro-
priate for the type of conflict now taking place.9  The confusion—
and its exploitation by the administration of President George W.
Bush—were neatly summarized by U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman in a
debate on provisions for the review of detainees’ status:
The administration has gone to great lengths to avoid the legal
restraints that normally would apply under our legal system.
They have argued that the laws of war are not applicable be-
cause we are fighting a new type of enemy.  They have argued
the criminal laws are not applicable because we are fighting a
war.10
This debate cannot be dismissed as a dry, abstract exercise in aca-
demic legalisms.  With the commitment of troops to military com-
bat operations against terrorist organizations abroad, beginning
with the deployment of U.S. and Coalition (including British)
forces to Afghanistan in October 2001, it is inevitable that some
rules of the law of armed conflict are applicable at least to certain
aspects of the “War on Terror.” It is therefore essential for both
soldiers and commanders to know what those rules are.  The prac-
tical conundrum has been succinctly summed up by Senator John
McCain, in introducing his amendment to the Department of De-
fense Appropriations Bill for 200611 in the wake of the Abu Ghraib
torture scandal:
I can understand why some administration lawyers might have
wanted ambiguity so that every hypothetical option is theoreti-
cally open, even those the President has said he does not want to
exercise.  But war doesn’t occur in theory and our troops are
not served by ambiguity.  They are crying out for clarity.12
Thus, if it is accepted that the international law of armed con-
flict may be applied to military operations in the “War on Terror,”
there are further legal definitions and distinctions that need to be
9 The terms “obsolete” and “quaint” were famously used to dismiss much of the
1949 Geneva Conventions by then White House Counsel, (and later U.S. Attorney
General) Alberto R. Gonzales.  Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales to President
George W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.humanrightsfirst.
com/us_law/etn/gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020125_Gonz_Bush.pdf .
10 151 CONG. REC. S12657-58 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman).
11 The McCain Amendment became the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005), in accordance with which the latest U.S. Army Field
Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations has since been revised. See infra note
165.
12 151 CONG. REC. S11062 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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made.  Is the armed conflict, for legal purposes, international or
non-international in nature?  Which rules govern the behavior of
troops in the field?  How, and in what circumstances, are terrorists
and other militants to be targeted?  How are detainees classified in
terms of their international law status, and what standards govern
their treatment in detention?
To a certain extent, debate within similar parameters has been
taking place in the United Kingdom.  Some aspects of the debate
are more limited.  For instance, the United Kingdom does not
carry out “targeted killings” or “assassinations” of terrorists or mili-
tants, and detention of foreign nationals captured in the “War on
Terror” has been less of an issue for the United Kingdom than for
the United States, not least because the United Kingdom has no
facility directly analogous to Guantánamo Bay.  There has generally
been less conceptual uncertainty over the nature of the “War on
Terror” in the United Kingdom, and—in purely military terms—
British operational doctrine has on the whole been clearer than its
U.S. equivalent in respect to the legal standards that govern the
behavior of British forces deployed overseas on anti-terrorist opera-
tions.  In the spring of 2006, however, the then-Defense Secretary
of the United Kingdom, John Reid, caused something of a stir
when he gave a speech in which he stated:
We owe it to ourselves . . . to constantly reappraise and update
the relationship between our underlying values, the legal instru-
ments which apply them to the world of conflict, and the histori-
cal circumstances in which they are to be applied, including the
nature of that conflict. . . .
.   .   .
Until recently it was assumed that only states could cause
mass casualties—and our rules, conventions and laws are largely
predicated on that basis.  That is quite plainly no longer the
case.  I believe we need now to consider whether we . . . need to
re-examine these conventions.  If we do not, we risk continuing
to fight a twenty-first century conflict with twentieth-century
rules. . . .
.   .   .
The Geneva Conventions were created more than half a century
ago, when the world was almost unrecognizable to today’s
citizens. . . .
The Conventions were supplemented, of course, by Addi-
tional Protocols, but even those—with one exception—were
drafted almost thirty years ago.  Of course, just because a law is
decades old it does not mean that it is redundant. . . .
However, when we think of the massive changes which the
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military have undergone to deal with new threats in the last dec-
ade alone, we get some idea of the scale of that change where
armed conflict is concerned.  In the light of those changes I be-
lieve we must ask serious questions about whether or not further
developments in international law in this area are necessary.”13
Its occasionally incoherent phraseology notwithstanding, the im-
port of Reid’s speech was plain enough and it was quickly seized on
by the media.14  It appeared to mirror, for the United Kingdom,
certain trends in the interpretation and application of interna-
tional humanitarian law to the “War on Terror” that were being
reported in other countries as well, notably in the United States15
and Canada.16  At the same time, its confusion is symptomatic of
the disarray in which international law found itself in the aftermath
of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
This Article presents comparative British and international
perspectives on selected problems posed by the legal classification
of the “War on Terror” as a matter of public international law.  The
starting point is not the specific technical questions concerning
classification and treatment of detainees—although those ques-
tions will indeed be considered later in the course of the paper—
rather, it is the more theoretical, but no less important, issue of the
fundamental nature of the “War on Terror.”  The confusion and
tension between the paradigms of armed conflict and criminal law
enforcement lie at the heart of the question of what legal frame-
work governs the various actors in the “War on Terror.”  This paper
examines the British experience in relation to the “Troubles” in
Northern Ireland (hereinafter “Troubles”)—in which organized
and systematic terrorist insurgency was dealt with fundamentally by
policing operations, albeit with large-scale military involvement—
and compares the Troubles with current experiences.  The com-
13 John Reid MP, Secretary of State for Defence, 20th-Century Rules, 21st-Century
Conflict, speech at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence (Apr. 3, 2006),
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20th
centuryRules21stcenturyConflict.htm.
14 See, e.g., Sam Coates, Reid Backs US on Guantanamo, THE TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, at 2;
Kim Sengupta, Geneva Convention ‘Should Be Updated’, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 4, 2006.
15 See, e.g., Julian E.  Barnes, Army Manual to Skip Geneva Detainee Rule, L.A. TIMES,
June 5, 2006, at A1.  But see infra note 165, for the sequel to this particular
controversy.
16 See Paul Koring, Troops Told Geneva Rules Don’t Apply to Taliban, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, 31 May 2006, at A1. Note that the allegations in this article were immediately
contradicted by the Minister of National Defence in the Canadian House of Com-
mons. Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1st Session, 39th Parliament, Official Report
(Hansard), Wednesday, May 31st, 2006, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?Language=&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=2234500.
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parison encompasses policy and military doctrine in the applica-
tion of the laws of armed conflict to military operations against
terrorists abroad, combined with the U.K. courts’ human rights-
oriented approach.  Also considered is a comparative perspective
from Israel, where the armed forces are routinely engaged in anti-
terrorist operations (often on a very substantial scale) and where
the Supreme Court of Israel, in its capacity as a high court of jus-
tice hearing petitions from and relating to the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territories, has developed an extensive jurisprudence on
various aspects of international humanitarian law.  This Article will
integrate in its analysis two selected aspects of military operations
in the “War on Terror,” namely the classification and treatment of
detainees, and the policy of “targeted killings” of terrorists, which
has been used by both the U.S. and Israel in the current scenario
and—in the modified form of the “shoot to kill policy”—by the
U.K. in Northern Ireland.  This Article will consider the implica-
tions of these developments in policy and doctrine for the interna-
tional law of armed conflict.
I. CONFUSION IN THE LEX GENERALIS: THE “GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR” AS WAR OR PEACE?
Over five years into the “War on Terror,” much of the initial
debate about the nature of the “war”17 has subsided.  Although he
was extremely curt in his dismissal of the use of the term “war” to
describe the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their con-
sequences in international law, one eminent scholar summed up
the significance of the use of such language succinctly:
Admittedly, the use of the term ‘war’ has a huge psychological
impact on public opinion.  It is intended to emphasize both that
the attack is so serious that it can be equated in its evil effects
with a state aggression, and also that the necessary response ex-
acts reliance on all resources and energies, as if in a state of
war.18
Apart from its psychological effects, use of the term “war” from the
17 See Crimes of War Project, Is this a New Kind of War? September 11 and Its
Aftermath, expert analysis, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/paradigm-intro.html
(last visited, July 14, 2007); Frederic L. Kirgis et al, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, American Society of International Law (ASIL) Insights (Sept.
2001), http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm.
18 Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of Inter-
national Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L.  993, 993 (2001); see also Meierhenrich, supra note 2,
at 7–25; Frédéric Mégret, ‘War’? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L.  361 (2002); Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L. J. 1871 (2004).
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perspective of public international law would normally have im-
plied the existence of a state of armed conflict.  This in turn would
have effects at the level of both the jus ad bellum (the international
law governing resort to the use of force) and the jus in bello (the
international law of armed conflict).  The latter context will be
considered in the next section of this Article.
In terms of the jus ad bellum, a state of “war” would presuppose
an armed attack within the sense of a violation of Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter or an act of aggression as understood in custom-
ary international law,19 such that would give rise to a right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the Charter.  Recognition of the latter
right, to the benefit of the U.S., was expressly given by the U.N.
Security Council in the resolution which it passed on September
12, 2001.20 Although I do not believe that it can be said with com-
plete certainty that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon actually constituted an “armed attack” within the
strict meaning of customary international law,21 contemporary
State practice does indicate that there is a fairly uncontroversial
right of self-defense against such attacks22—at which point an
armed conflict would generally be said to be taking place.  This
approach, however, is not universal: when it has struck back against
Palestinian militants by means of missile strikes or air raids, Israel
has typically denied that it is engaged in an armed conflict with the
19 This presupposition is evidenced by the U.N. General Assembly’s definition of
aggression. Declaration on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc
A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
20 S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
21 Definition of Aggression, supra note 19, requires inter alia that the activities
amounting to aggression be either the direct action of a State (if involving regular
armed forces) or be in the form of “sending by or on behalf of a State . . . or its
substantial involvement” (if involving irregular forces, guerrillas etc.).  G.A. Res. 3314
(XXIX), supra note 19, Annex art.  3.  Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is not acting on
behalf of any State.
22 This is notwithstanding the International Court of Justice’s statement that a
State cannot invoke the Article 51 right of self-defense against terrorist attacks not
imputable to a foreign State and emanating from a territory over which it “exercises
control.”  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶¶ 138–39 (July 9).  The court ad-
dressed only the right of self-defense under Article 51, without considering the
“inherent right” under customary international law, to which Article 51 refers.  The
opinion also failed to consider the specific aspects of Israel’s situation in responding
to acts of terrorism emanating either from Palestinian territory under Israeli belliger-
ent occupation, or from areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority (which is
not a State but is equally not an area where Israel legally “exercises control”).  For
criticism of the Advisory Opinion on these points, see Christian J. Tams, Light Treat-
ment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963
(2005).
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Palestinian Authority, but insists that it is lawfully exercising its
right of self-defense.23  This position is not impossible to sustain.
For instance, two States might have a tit-for-tat exchange of bom-
bardments or raids across their mutual frontier while simultane-
ously attempting to maintain peacetime relations and avoid an
escalation of hostilities into a general armed conflict.24  Conversely,
the U.K. and Argentina formally denied that they were “at war”
during the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, which saw sus-
tained military combat operations taking place on a substantial
scale over a period of several weeks.25 Legally, however, an armed
attack that leads to self-defense will normally involve a resulting
armed conflict, even if very limited in scope and of very short dura-
tion.  If the notion of an armed conflict is accepted as applicable in
such circumstances, does it cover the entire geographical and tem-
poral spectrum of the “War on Terror,” or is it more limited than
that?
Historically—certainly until the advent of the U.N. Charter re-
gime governing the use of force in 1945—armed conflict was lim-
ited temporally.  Conflicts normally began with mutual
declarations of war and ended with one or more treaties of peace.
Even in cases where military hostilities began without a declaration
of war, as in the surprise Japanese torpedo attack on the Imperial
Russian Navy’s Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur in 1904,26 formal
declarations of war still followed as a matter of course. Without
these declarations, the formal peacetime relations of the belliger-
ents, such as diplomatic relations, could not legally be altered in
23 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Israel’s Intensified Military Campaign Against Terrorism, ASIL
Insights (December 2001), http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh78.htm (last visited
July, 14 2007).
24 An example might be the situation between India and Pakistan, which is perma-
nently tense along much of their shared frontier, particularly in the disputed region
of Kashmir.  Periodically the tension escalates into episodes of terrorist bombings,
counter-insurgency operations and localized artillery bombardments, yet the two
countries have not considered themselves to be in an armed conflict with each other
since the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.  Even during episodes
of heightened tension, India and Pakistan maintain diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions. See generally Anthony Wanis St. John, Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Be-
tween India and Pakistan, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 173 (1997).
25 For example, in response to a parliamentary question on the repatriation of
captured Argentinian soldiers to Argentina under the terms of Geneva Convention
III, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated, “I should make one point clear. These
are not prisoners of war. A state of war does not exist between ourselves and the
Argentine.” 22 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) 616.
26 The Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur, on the night of February 8/9, 1904,
preceded the formal Imperial Proclamation of War on February 10. Imperial Proclama-
tion of War, available at http://www.russojapanesewar.com/imp-proc-04.html.
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the way required by the replacement of a state of peace with a state
of war.  Likewise, absent a treaty of peace, a state of war formally
subsists, even if no organized hostilities between the belligerents
are taking place.  Thus, those Arab States—Lebanon, Syria, and
Iraq—whose armed forces participated in military action against
the new State of Israel in 1948-1949, but which have not since con-
cluded peace treaties with the Jewish State, may be considered to
be technically still in a state of war with it because the various armi-
stice agreements concluded between Israel and those States in
1949 suspended, but did not terminate, the state of war between
them.27
It is self-evident that the “War on Terror” does not fit within
such a state-centric paradigm of international relations.  For all the
rhetorical references to al Qaeda “declaring war” on the U.S., on
democracy, on liberty, or on the West, al Qaeda has done no such
thing in any legal sense of the term.  A concept which may be of
assistance in formally classifying the “War on Terror” in interna-
tional law, however, is the so-called status mixtus, wherein relations
between States sometimes “deteriorated to a point where neither
peace nor war in the strict sense existed, and states observed for
some purposes the law of peace, and for others the law of war.”28
Adapting the status mixtus framework to the context of dealing with
international terrorism, it is clear that the “War on Terror,” for all
its militaristic rhetoric, actually comprises several legal mecha-
nisms.  Writing nearly two decades ago, Antonio Cassese posited
two basic frameworks for responding to terrorism in international
law: the “peaceful” way, by enforcing criminal law on the national
and transnational levels, sequestrating assets, and securing interna-
tional police and judicial co-operation in the investigation, extradi-
tion, and prosecution of terrorist networks and individual terrorist
suspects; and the “coercive” way, by engaging State armed forces in
military operations against terrorist organizations.29 Within this
“framework” approach to the problem, the correct position must
be that:
27 For a detailed discussion of various legal interpretations of the 1949
Arab–Israeli Armistice Agreements, see Asher Maoz, War and Peace—An Israeli Perspec-
tive, 14 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM, no. 2, at 35 (2005).
28 LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 70 (2d ed. 2000).
See also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 16–20 (2001).
29 Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 589 (1989).  The tags “peaceful” and “coercive” are used purely
for convenience. See also Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abun-
dant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499 (2004–2005).
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[War] exists, and the laws of war apply, when facts on the
ground establish the existence of armed conflict, regardless of
any declaration or lack thereof . . . . While  . . . true armed con-
flicts and the so-called “global war against terror” may—or may
not—overlap, the law of armed conflict can only be applied to
that which is truly armed conflict.  That which is not truly armed
conflict remains, and should remain, governed by domestic and
international criminal and human rights laws.”30
In practice, different States have taken different approaches to
the legal treatment of situations involving terrorism in different
places and at different times.  Useful comparators for the present
analysis are the positions taken by the U.K. in respect to the North-
ern Ireland “Troubles” (1969 to date), and by Israel in confronting
armed violence by militant groups in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritories, particularly during the “Second Intifada,” which has been
ongoing since 2000.  What these situations have in common, while
obviously quite diverse in their precise aspects, is that they have
both involved the deployment of armed forces on active operations
of a counterinsurgency or counterterrorist nature.  Additionally,
the legal classification of the current “War on Terror” as war or
peace has recently been addressed by the supreme courts of two
nations prominently and actively engaged in that “War,” especially
with its military aspects: the U.S. and Israel.31  These decisions are
particularly interesting for a number of reasons.  Both deal with
fundamental issues of whether action against terrorist organiza-
tions should be considered to fall within the peacetime or wartime
paradigm for international law purposes, and both deal with differ-
ent aspects of technical detail in the prosecution of such action.
The American decision concerns the status and treatment of de-
tainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and therefore concentrates on
the protection of victims of conflict,32 while the Israeli decision
deals with the legality of a particular method of prosecuting mili-
tary operations against individual terrorist leaders, namely the pol-
30 Rona, supra note 29, at 503.
31 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against
Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/
files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
32 The term “protection of victims of conflict” is used here in its international
humanitarian law sense, namely, that once an individual, whether combatant or civil-
ian, has been captured by the opposing side in hostilities, that individual is regarded
as a victim of the conflict.  He or she is no longer actively participating in hostilities (if
a combatant) or free of the control of one of the parties to the conflict (if a civilian).
The term does not imply that such a person, though considered a “victim,” cannot be
held liable for illegal acts committed before capture or detention. See Additional Pro-
tocol I, infra note 48.
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icy of “targeted killings” (or assassinations, depending on one’s
point of view).33  Neither decision is of purely academic interest.
With U.S. forces engaged in theaters like Afghanistan and Iraq,
and Israeli forces undertaking a variety of operations against Pales-
tinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza, court decisions from
both countries are likely to have a very real practical impact on the
behavior of troops on the ground.
II. THE U.K. EXPERIENCE: THE NORTHERN IRELAND “TROUBLES”
AND THE ARMED CONFLICT PARADIGM
The experience of the U.K. in dealing with Northern Ireland
offers one of the best known and most studied situations in recent
and contemporary history of a Western liberal democracy using
military force to suppress a terrorist insurgency and the associated
violence within a framework governed, at least ostensibly, by the
rule of law.  The use of the term “the Troubles” to refer to the
situation in Northern Ireland during the period between the gen-
eral breakdown in law and order in August 1969 (which led to the
initial deployment of British troops on the streets of the province)
and the conclusion of the Good Friday Peace Agreement of April
1998, despite its bare adequacy as a euphemism for the violence of
that period, carefully avoids any specific categorization of the
Northern Ireland situation.  The refusal of both the British and
Irish governments to treat Northern Ireland as an international is-
sue that should, for instance, have been placed on the agenda of
the U.N., along with the authorities’ policy of police primacy in
dealing with the situation, meant that most people have not tradi-
tionally viewed the Troubles as an armed conflict in any interna-
tional law sense of the term.  Nevertheless, the language of armed
conflict was expressly used, at least rhetorically, in relation to the
Troubles.  The last Prime Minister of Northern Ireland before the
introduction of direct rule from London in 1972, Brian Faulkner,
said categorically when he introduced the power of internment
without trial that Northern Ireland was “quite simply at war with
the terrorist.”34  Various Irish nationalist movements, and notably
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), expressly made a point of seeing
their struggle as nothing short of a war of self-determination and
33 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006].
34 BBC On This Day, 1971: Northern Ireland Activates Internment Law, Aug. 9,
1971, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/low/dates/stories/august/9/newsid_4071
000/4071849.stm.
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national liberation from a foreign army of occupation.35  Yet, for
all that, the prevailing analysis of the Troubles is not conducted
within the armed conflict paradigm (or even within any interna-
tional law paradigm, except as regards the application of human
rights norms).  Admittedly, the Troubles are not directly compara-
ble to the current “War on Terror” by virtue of their location al-
most entirely within the territorial jurisdiction of one State and
their perpetrators mostly having the nationality of that State,
namely the U.K.  However, certain legal aspects of the use of mili-
tary forces in Northern Ireland are of interest for the reasons indi-
cated at the beginning of this section.
The most striking feature of the deployment and use of British
military forces in Northern Ireland, to a lawyer, is its apparent lack
of any clear basis in U.K. law.  The use of forces was an executive
decision of the British Government, made in response to a political
request from the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in August
1969.  At the time, paramount responsibility for the maintenance
of public order in Northern Ireland rested with the province’s Min-
ister of Home Affairs, under Section 1(2) of the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922.36  British Army
troops had been present in Northern Ireland continuously since
the independence of the Free State in the south of the island and
its de facto partition in 1921, but prior to the rapid escalation in
sectarian communal violence in mid-1969, their numbers had been
very small (only around 2,500), confined to barracks as in other
parts of the U.K., and only occasionally deployed to guard certain
public utilities.37  Law enforcement duties on the streets of North-
ern Ireland were entirely in the hands of the regular police force of
the province, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and the so-
called “B Specials,” a leftover from the Ulster Special Constabulary
whose task it had been, since the turmoil of the early 1920s, to
augment the normal police force during times of tension.38  The
common law has always permitted the military to react to a request
for assistance from the civil authority.39  This was precisely the
method used in the small hours of August 14, 1969 when the RUC
in Belfast and Londonderry, confronted with large-scale and wors-
ening rioting by elements of the local Catholic population in both
35 See C.P. Walker, Irish Republican Prisoners—Political Detainees, Prisoners of War or
Common Criminals?, 19 THE IRISH JURIST 189, 189–90 (1984).
36 See ROBIN EVELEGH, PEACE KEEPING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 14 (1978).
37 COLONEL MICHAEL DEWAR, THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 32 (1996).
38 Id. at 20–21.
39 See EVELEGH, supra note 36, at 8–11.
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cities, concluded that all police reserves (including the B Specials)
had been committed and that the violence could not be contained
without military assistance.
The RUC asked the Minister of Home Affairs in Belfast to re-
quest deployment of the Army on the streets to help suppress the
disturbances.  The request was not transmitted to London until af-
ter midday on August 14th, but British Cabinet approval for the
deployment of troops was given within a couple of hours, and the
soldiers were deployed on the streets by nightfall.40  The process
was subsequently recorded in an official Communiqué in the fol-
lowing terms:
In a six-hour discussion the whole situation in Northern Ireland
was reviewed.  It was agreed that the GOC [General Officer
Commanding] Northern Ireland will with immediate effect as-
sume overall responsibility for security operations.  He will con-
tinue to be responsible directly to the Ministry of Defence but
will work in the closest co-operation with the Northern Ireland
Government and the Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Con-
stabulary [RUC].  For all security operations the GOC will have
full control of the deployment and tasks of the [RUC].  For nor-
mal police duties outside the field of security the [RUC] will
remain answerable to the Inspector-General who will be respon-
sible to the Northern Ireland Government.
The GOC will assume full command and control of the Ulster
Special Constabulary for all purposes including their organisa-
tion, deployment, tasks and arms.  Their employment by the
Northern Ireland Government in riot and crowd control was al-
ways envisaged as a purely temporary measure.  With the in-
creased deployment of the Army and the assumption by the
GOC of operational control of all the security forces, it will be
possible for the [B Specials] to be progressively and rapidly re-
lieved of these temporary duties at his discretion . . . .41
The appended Declaration then stated, inter alia:
(2) The United Kingdom Government again affirm that respon-
sibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of do-
mestic jurisdiction. . . .
(3) The United Kingdom Government have ultimate responsi-
bility for the protection of those who live in Northern Ireland
when, as in the past week, a breakdown of law and order has
occurred.  In this spirit, the United Kingdom Government re-
sponded to the requests of the Northern Ireland Government
40 Id. at 6–7; DEWAR, supra note 37, at 33.
41 NORTHERN IRELAND: TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUÉ AND DECLARATION ISSUED AFTER A
MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET, Aug. 19, 1969, Cmnd. 4154.
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for military assistance in Londonderry and Belfast in order to
restore law and order.  They emphasise again that the troops
will be withdrawn when law and order has been restored.
(4) The Northern Ireland Government have been informed that
troops have been provided on a temporary basis in accordance
with the United Kingdom’s ultimate responsibility. . . .42
Thus began the first of three broad phases identified in the
Troubles:  the “militarization” phase, which lasted from 1969 to
1976; followed by the “criminalization” (1977-1994) and “transi-
tion” (1995-2004) phases,43 culminating in the return of devolved
rule to Northern Ireland in December 1999 under the provisions
of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.44  In the early stages of the “mili-
tarization” phase, there was much initial use of “war talk” by the
British authorities, but this sort of language was quickly abandoned
as it was seen to be counterproductive.45  Likewise, the IRA made
use of the language of armed conflict in its unsuccessful attempts
to claim prisoner of war (POW) status for its members who had
been interned by the security forces.46  Nevertheless, at no time did
the U.K. accept the categorization of the situation in Northern Ire-
land as any kind of armed conflict in an international law sense of
the term.47
The Northern Ireland situation was in fact instrumental in the
United Kingdom’s inordinate delay in ratification of the two Addi-
tional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.48  Although it
42 Id.
43 Colm Campbell, ‘Wars on Terror’ and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, International
Law, and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 326 (2005).
44 Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (U.K.).  Although the institutions of devolved
government in Northern Ireland were suspended and direct rule from London rein-
troduced in February 2000, the continuing near-total cessation of paramilitary activity
and progressive demilitarization of the province provide a strong case for asserting
that the Troubles effectively ended in 1999. Full devolution was restored to Northern
Ireland in May 2007 following the election of an Executive with ministers represent-
ing both Unionist and Nationalist political parties.
45 See Campbell, supra note 43, at 325.
46 Id. at 330; Walker, supra note 35, at 208–21.  It is highly unlikely, to say the least,
that any State would ever be prepared to consider its own nationals as POWs, given
that the whole regime of the Geneva Conventions is intended to apply protection to
those persons of the hostile party (meaning hostile State) who are hors de combat.  For
the same reason—that they hold the nationality of the same State (i.e. the U.K.)—
IRA detainees could not have been considered “protected persons” in terms of the
Geneva Conventions.
47 Campbell, supra note 43, at 333; Walker, supra note 35, at 190–92.  Also note the
terms of the U.K.’s reservation to the Additional Protocols, infra text accompanying
note 49.
48 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125
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signed the Protocols in 1977, the U.K. was sufficiently put off by
the threat, however intangible, that either of them might actually
be applied to the situation in Northern Ireland, that it avoided rati-
fying them until 1998.49  It is no coincidence that this was the very
year in which de-escalation and demilitarization in Northern Ire-
land really began to take effect.50  At eventual ratification, the U.K.
was still careful to enter inter alia the following reservation, which
would have precluded the Northern Ireland situation from being
considered an international armed conflict within the scope of ap-
plication of Additional Protocol I:
It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term
‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context denotes a situation of
a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary
crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.
The United Kingdom will not, in relation to any situation in which
it is itself involved, consider itself bound in consequence of any
declaration purporting to be made under [Article 96(3) of the
Protocol] unless the United Kingdom shall have expressly
recognised that it has been made by a body which is genuinely
an authority representing a people engaged in an armed con-
flict of the type to which [Article 1(4)] applies.51
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Addi-
tional Protocol II].
49 Corrected Letter of 28 January 1998 sent to the Swiss Gov’t by Christopher
Hulse, HM Ambassador of the U.K. (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter Corrected Letter],
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003F
B6D2?OpenDocument.
50 It was in 1998 that all the major paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland,
both Nationalist and Unionist, variously announced ceasefires or “suspension of mili-
tary operations.” See Cain Web Service, The Irish Peace Process—Chronology of Key
Events (Apr. 1998 – Dec. 1999), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9899.htm
(last visited July 14, 2007).
51 Corrected Letter, supra note 49 (emphasis added).  The significance of Article
1(4) is that it includes within the scope of application of the Protocol, “armed con-
flicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination”; Article
96(3) then provides for an “authority representing a people engaged against a High
Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in [Article 1(4)]” to
make a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and Ad-
ditional Protocol I.  The IRA, in claiming to be fighting a war of national liberation/
self-determination in Northern Ireland, clearly was positioning itself to make such a
declaration, although in fact it never did so.  No doubt this was at least partly due to
the fact that the rights and obligations of the Conventions and Protocols only take
effect following a unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) on a basis of reciprocity,
i.e. the High Contracting Party in question must also have assumed the same rights
and obligations under the same instruments.  In the case of Northern Ireland, not
only had the United Kingdom avoided ratifying the Additional Protocols, it had also
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Likewise, the U.K. never accepted that the violence in North-
ern Ireland, although intermittently severe, reached the threshold
required for the application of Additional Protocol II as a non-in-
ternational armed conflict.  This requires that the hostilities take
place:
[I]n the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such con-
trol over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement
this Protocol.52
The various paramilitary organizations might be said to have been
under responsible command, at least in theory; the IRA’s leader-
ship, in particular, consisted of an “Army Council,” whose direc-
tives were clearly obeyed by IRA operational units, designated as
“commands,” “brigades,” and “battalions.”53  There were times and
places during the Troubles where the conditions of de facto con-
trol over territory were arguably met by the IRA, such as the “No-
Go” areas, which were basically Republican enclaves with con-
trolled access in certain parts of Londonderry and Belfast,54 and
the “bandit country” of South Armagh,55 where British Army pa-
trols were regularly ambushed by snipers and field units similar to
the Flying Columns employed by the IRA during the Anglo-Irish
War and the subsequent Irish Civil War between 1919 and 1922.
However, these episodes were too sporadic and unrelated to the
overall situation elsewhere in the province, and they were generally
of insufficient consistency for them to be said to have constituted a
non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Protocol
II. In the words of Article 1(2) of  Protocol II, the Troubles never
consistently rose above the intensity of “internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature” such that they could be considered
as amounting to a non-international armed conflict; this was a forti-
ori the case in respect to it being an international armed conflict.
As it has been suggested, “the Northern Ireland conflict [sic] is
generally viewed as having hovered in the grey area between some
made it clear that it did not accept the IRA’s right to claim that it was an “authority” of
the type required.  Even a commentator generally unsympathetic to the U.K.’s posi-
tion notes that, “[i]n retrospect . . . it is difficult to see how Protocol I’s conditions of
applicability could be said to have been met.”  Campbell, supra note 43, at 332.
52 Additional Protocol II, supra note 48, art. 1(1).
53 See DEWAR, supra note 37, at 49–51.
54 Id. at 69–70.
55 Id. at 123.
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form of non-international armed conflict . . . and the lower inten-
sity category of ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions.’”56
For all that the situation in Northern Ireland was not consid-
ered to amount to an armed conflict, the fact remains that there
were troops on the ground undertaking military operations.  In any
such situation, the actions of armed forces must be subject to rules
of law; otherwise, the potential for abuse is obvious.  If the situation
had been an armed conflict within the meaning of international
law, then the applicable rules would have been those of interna-
tional humanitarian law, as discussed above.  But in a case where
the situation is not judged to amount to an armed conflict, then,
irrespective of how the situation is characterized (i.e. as an “emer-
gency”), the actions of British soldiers remain at all times subject to
military law.  In the U.K., military law basically encompasses two
things:  (1) the “service legislation,” namely Acts of Parliament and
associated secondary legislative instruments or non-binding admin-
istrative instructions specifically promulgated for the regulation of
all aspects of the armed forces; and (2) the ordinary criminal law of
the land, both statutes and common law rules.  Throughout the
period of the Troubles, the service legislation consisted of the
Army Act 1955, the Royal Air Force Act 1955, and the Naval Disci-
pline Act 1957; the administrative instructions consisted of the
Queen’s Regulations for the Army.57
British forces deployed on military operations overseas during
an armed conflict are obviously entitled to use lethal force against
hostile forces.  However, because the territory of Northern Ireland
is part of the U.K., and because the urban setting caused the “hos-
tile forces” to be mixed in with civilians (most of whom were Brit-
ish nationals, and, in any given situation, may or may not have
been IRA operatives) the actions of British troops were subject to
the ordinary criminal law.  If a British soldier shot a foreign enemy
combatant in an armed conflict, that would obviously be a permis-
sible use of lethal force, but if the same soldier shot a British or
foreign national on British territory in time of peace, that would
potentially be murder or manslaughter.58  So, to govern the use of
56 Campbell, supra note 43, at 331.  Although I would dispute that this was necessa-
rily the “general” view, as asserted (with little evidence) by Campbell, it is one that I
readily subscribe to myself.
57 The Queen’s Regulations for the Army 1975 [including Amendment 27], 1AC
13206, available at http://www.army.mod.uk/linkedfiles/servingsoldier/termsofserv/
discmillaw/ref/queens_regulations_incl_a27.pdf.
58 A very extensive case law has accumulated since the early 1970s concerning the
use of excessive or lethal force by security forces in Northern Ireland, in most of
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force by British soldiers on duty in Northern Ireland, the security
forces in the province were issued rules of engagement in the form
of the so-called “Yellow Card,” a set of internal instructions indicat-
ing the circumstances in which the use of force was permissible.
The Yellow Card provided, inter alia, as follows:
General Rules
2. Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable
you to carry out your duties.




6. Whenever possible a warning should be given before you
open fire.
. . .
You may fire after due warning
8. Against a person carrying what you can positively identify as a
firearm, but only if you have reason to think that he is about to
use it for offensive purposes; he refuses to halt when called
upon to do so, and there is no other way of stopping him.
9. Against a person throwing a petrol bomb if petrol bomb at-
tacks continue in your area against troops and civilians or
against property, if his action is likely to endanger life.
10. Against a person attacking or destroying property or stealing
firearms or explosives, if his action is likely to endanger life.
11. Against a person who, though he is not a person attacking,
has:
a. in your sight killed or seriously injured a member of the secur-
ity forces or a person whom it is your duty to protect and
b. not halted when called upon to do so and cannot be arrested
by any other means.
12. If there is no other way to protect yourself or those whom it
is your duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seri-
ously injured.
You may fire without warning
13. When hostile fire is taking place in your area and a warning
is impracticable:
a. against a person using a firearm against you or those whom it
is your duty to protect
which the relevant soldiers have been charged with murder or manslaughter under
the criminal law of Northern Ireland.  For discussion and analysis, see DERMOT P.J.
WALSH, BLOODY SUNDAY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 157–83 (2000);
Brice Dickson, The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict—A Sequel, 69 MODERN
L. REV. 383 (2006).
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b. against a person carrying what you can positively identify as a
firearm if he is clearly about to use it for offensive purposes.
14. At a vehicle if the occupants open fire or throw a bomb at
you or those whom it is your duty to protect or are clearly about
to do so.
15. If there is no other way to protect yourself or those whom it
is your duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seri-
ously injured.59
The rules for opening fire in the Yellow Card clearly encapsulated,
on a micro level, “the British tradition of minimum force to solve
any given situation.”60  At the macro level, this traditional approach
was also evidenced by such large-scale military actions as Operation
Motorman, the name given to the July 31, 1972 reoccupation by
the British security forces of the “No-Go” areas in West Belfast, the
Bogside, and Creggan (Londonderry).  The security forces had
been under orders not to enter these areas, which were barricaded
and entirely controlled by IRA gunmen, for several months.  For
Operation Motorman, some 21,000 troops were deployed, includ-
ing Royal Navy and Marine units who participated in a beach land-
ing on the Foyle Estuary near Londonderry. However, the
impending operation was publicly announced beforehand by the
British authorities in Northern Ireland with the explicit intention
of preventing or minimizing civilian casualties.61  As a direct result
of the broadcast warnings, the IRA left the “No-Go” areas before
the start of Operation Motorman, which then met with virtually no
armed resistance.62  The success of Operation Motorman has been
compared to other counter-insurgency operations by the British
military, notably the reoccupation of the Crater in Aden in 1967,
which took place by night when the South Arabian Army insur-
gents who had occupied the area were sleeping; again, there was
virtually no opposition as a result.63
The British approach to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, as
to various other counter-insurgency or anti-terrorist operations
elsewhere in the world like the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960),64
59 WALSH, supra note 58, at 184–85.
60 DEWAR, supra note 37, at 69.
61 Id. at 66–69.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 70.
64 See SAM C. SARKESIAN, UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS IN A NEW SECURITY ERA: LES-
SONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM 55–78 (1993); Richard Stubbs, The Malayan Emergency
and the Development of the Malaysian State, in THE COUNTER-INSURGENT STATE: GUER-
RILLA WARFARE AND STATE BUILDING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 50 (Paul B. Rich &
Richard Stubbs eds., 1997).
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was essentially that the situation in the province constituted an
“emergency,” subject to special legal regulation, in which the Army
was assisting the police in maintaining law and order.  In modern
doctrinal terms, this is classified as Military Aid to the Civil Power.65
From 1957 to 1984, and again from 1988 to 2001, the “emergency”
was considered to justify continuous derogations from the U.K.’s
obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and there were many
occasions on which British soldiers were accused of using excessive
force—judged by the standards of the ordinary criminal law and
European human rights law.66  Nevertheless, this was not an armed
conflict in the sense of international law.  After the “militarization”
phase of the Troubles had passed its height between 1971 and
1975, when the policy of internment was in place and terrorist sus-
pects were detained without trial67 and subjected to “in-depth in-
terrogation”68 which resulted in claims of torture,69 the British
Government’s approach to the problem was increasingly character-
ized by the treatment of terrorist activity associated with Northern
Ireland as criminal offenses and their prosecution under the ordi-
nary criminal law.
65 See UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication—British Defence Doctrine (2d
ed.), JWP 0-01, 6–9.
66 The most famous of these during the later stages of the Troubles was undoubt-
edly Regina v. Clegg, [1995] 1 A.C. 482 (H.L. 1995) (appeal taken from the Court of
Appeal in Northern Ireland) (convicting a British soldier who, while manning a
checkpoint in Belfast, shot dead a “joy rider” who failed to stop a stolen car at the
checkpoint); and McCann v. United Kingdom, [1995] Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (holding the
U.K. liable for the shooting, by British special forces, of three IRA suspects in Gibral-
tar).  For a general overview of these and other criminal law cases relevant to the use
of force by the security forces during the Troubles, see WALSH, supra note 58. It
should be noted that, despite the considerable negative publicity generated by these
and other similar cases, they actually constituted only a tiny percentage of operations
overall in relation to Northern Ireland.
67 See DEWAR, supra note 37, at 52–55.
68 This included use of the so-called “five techniques,” namely: sensory depriva-
tion, disorientation, the “standing position,” sleep deprivation, and subjection to
“white noise.” See id. at 55.  The Parker Committee, established by the British Govern-
ment to consider the legality of such interrogations, studiously avoided any conclusive
determination of the applicability of either Geneva Convention III or IV to the situa-
tion in Northern Ireland. Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to consider
authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, Mar. 1972, Cmnd.
4901, Majority Report, ¶¶ 4–6.
69 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), the European
Court of Human Rights held that there was an emergency in Northern Ireland that
justified the United Kingdom’s derogation from human rights standards in respect of
powers of arrest and internment without trial, and that the “five techniques” applied
in interrogation constituted inhuman and degrading treatment but did not amount
to torture. Id. at 86.
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III. CONFUSION IN THE LEX SPECIALIS: THE “GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR” AS INTERNATIONAL OR NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT, AND WHETHER IT MATTERS
In the same way that the classical concept of war traditionally
had temporal parameters set by declarations of war and treaties of
peace, the legal classification of armed conflicts has also always de-
pended on the identities of the belligerent parties and the territo-
rial extent of hostilities.  Again, the classical doctrine has
recognized two types of armed conflict: international and non-in-
ternational.70 The former traditionally constitutes wars between
States,71 the latter constitutes wars between a government and in-
surgent forces in its own territory or between dissident armed
groups within the territory of a single State.72 In modern jurispru-
dence, these traditional distinctions have become blurred some-
what, a development that was precipitated by the armed conflicts
that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.  Within
the two major conflicts, namely the civil war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina on the one hand, and the inter-State conflict between Croa-
tia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the other,
there were various “sub-conflicts,” notably between Serbs and
Croats, Muslims and Croats, and Muslims and Serbs within Bosnia.
The intermittent involvement of the regular armed forces of both
the FRY and Croatia only added to the complexity of the situation.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), in its very first case,73 was faced with a challenge to its juris-
diction in which, inter alia, it was suggested that either the situa-
tion in Bosnia did not amount to an armed conflict in the
international law sense of the term, or in the alternative that it was
a non-international armed conflict.  The distinction was of crucial
importance for determining the applicability of criminal charges,
since the ICTY Statute contains provisions for jurisdiction over
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions74 and customary
70 See GREEN, supra note 28, 54–55.
71 Note that the conventions formally applicable to international armed conflicts
nowhere define what is meant by this scope of application; the common understand-
ing stated herein, therefore, might be said to constitute the customary international
law definition of such conflicts. See infra text accompanying notes 74–82.
72 This definition is taken from Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II, supra note
48.
73 Prosecutor v. Tadić , Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
74 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 2, annexed
to Report of the Secretary–General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of U.N. Security Council
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law war crimes75 (which at the time were generally thought to be
applicable only in international armed conflicts),76 but does not
expressly cover violations committed in non-international armed
conflicts.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber, holding that it was not nec-
essary for it to determine the nature of the armed conflict in Bos-
nia—since the U.N. Security Council, in its resolution establishing
the Tribunal,77 had refrained from doing so—found that:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between gov-
ernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State.  International humanitarian law ap-
plies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-
yond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of
peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved.  Until that moment, international hu-
manitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole ter-
ritory under the control of a party [to the conflict], whether or
not actual combat takes place there.78
The importance of the distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts is both formal and normative.
The formal difference is that an international armed conflict re-
quires there to be at least two State parties to the conflict. Histori-
cally, only conflicts between States were considered as “wars” and
were therefore subject to regulation by the international law of
armed conflict;79 whereas non-international armed conflicts tradi-
tionally were civil wars, typically fought between a governmental
authority and an insurgent movement in rebellion against that au-
thority.80 Such conflicts traditionally were outside the scope of reg-
ulation by the international law of armed conflict,81 although
historically there were always exceptions, wherein conflicts that
were substantively civil in nature were “internationalized” by acts of
Resolution 808, May 19, 1993, U.N. Doc S/25704, reprinted in 32 INT’L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 1159, 1192 (1993).
75 Id. at art. 3.
76 See David Turns, War Crimes Without War?—The Applicability of International Hu-
manitarian Law to Atrocities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 7 REVUE AFRICAINE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARÉ 804 (1995).
77 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
78 Tadić, supra note 73, ¶ 70.  For discussion and analysis of this and subsequent
ICTY jurisprudence on point, see Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: International or Non-
International?, 6 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 63 (2001).
79 See GREEN, supra note 28, 54–55.
80 Id. at 65–67.
81 See Turns, supra note 76.
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third parties.82 On this formalistic level, the “Global War on Ter-
rorism” is clearly neither international nor non-international in na-
ture, although certain episodes within the “War” might fall into
one category or the other.  For instance, the fighting in Afghani-
stan in late 2001 and early 2002 was clearly international inasmuch
as the Coalition forces were fighting against Taliban militia who
represented the de facto government of Afghanistan.
The normative difference between international and non-in-
ternational armed conflicts is, in my analysis, of much greater im-
portance.  This difference, in essence, is that the precise legal rules
applicable in each type of conflict are slightly different.  Specifi-
cally, the law of international armed conflicts is highly regulated,
with a large number of very detailed treaties, while the law in non-
international conflicts is considerably more vague and of greater
generality.83  Such concepts as combatant and POW status, pro-
tected persons, and grave breaches are unknown to the legal regu-
lation of non-international armed conflicts.  Until the seminal
ICTY decision in Tadić 84 a dozen years ago, there was no notion of
individual criminal responsibility for violations of the law in inter-
nal conflicts.  Regulation of the methods and means of warfare in
non-international conflicts was rudimentary;85 weaponry conven-
tions, with very few exceptions, did not apply in non-international
armed conflicts.86 Although this state of affairs—particularly in re-
gards to humanitarian protection in non-international armed con-
flicts—has not survived the trend towards greater humanitarianism
82 The classic example of such a conflict is the American Civil War: were the Con-
federate States of America a separate State in the international law sense of the term?
If they were, then, notwithstanding popular nomenclature, the conflict would be clas-
sified as international in nature by today’s standards.  The more traditional view,
though, is that through lack of international recognition de jure, the Confederate
States of America never constituted a State in international law.  Therefore the con-
flict was non-international in nature, although the U.S. institution of a maritime
blockade around the Southern coastline and the British and French Declarations of
Neutrality strongly suggested that the conflict was to a certain extent “international-
ized.” See Lindsay Moir, The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian
Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts to 1949, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 337, 343, 345 &
348–49 (1998). Similar characteristics could be said to have attached to the Spanish
Civil War (1936–1939), despite the general non-recognition of belligerency: id. at
352–353.
83 See GREEN, supra note 28, 54–69.
84 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 78.
85 See David Turns, At the “Vanishing Point” of International Humanitarian Law: Meth-
ods and Means of Warfare in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 45 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L.
115 (2002).
86 See David Turns, Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanita-
rian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 208–11 (2006).
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that took place in approximately the last quarter of the twentieth
century,87 it remains the case that non-international armed con-
flicts are distinctly under-regulated in comparison with their inter-
national siblings.  The significance of this is highly practical and is
perfectly illustrated by the problem of combatant status.
Soldiers fighting in an international armed conflict against the
armed forces of a foreign State know very well, albeit perhaps at a
somewhat “basic” level, that enemy soldiers whom they capture are
combatants, and therefore prisoners of war upon capture, entitled
to certain privileges and standards of treatment.  The rules of en-
gagement, or “soldier’s card,” with which they are issued at the
start of each conflict make that clear.88 The rules applicable in in-
ternational armed conflict specify that everyone is either a combat-
ant or a civilian, and that enemy combatants are entitled to POW
status provided that they satisfy the requirements of lawful belliger-
ency.89 In the event of any doubt, they should be treated as if they
are POWs, pending a determination of their status by a competent
tribunal.90 If they are POWs, the Detaining Power may only hold
them until the end of the conflict, whereupon they must be re-
leased and repatriated.91 The prisoners may be charged as war
criminals for specific offenses allegedly committed prior to cap-
ture,92 but not for mere participation in hostilities, as lawful com-
batants are permitted to engage in hostile activities.93 Soldiers
fighting against insurgents in an internal conflict, however, know
no such certainty.  A captured insurgent may very well not be a
POW, but he must be something in legal terms—what is he? What
rights does he have? These conundrums apply a fortiori in the case
of “terrorists” captured on the battlefield, at which point the theo-
87 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
239 (2000).
88 For example, the Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces state, inter alia, “Do not
engage anyone who has surrendered or is out of battle due to sickness or wounds. . . .
The use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to protect the following: . . .
Enemy Prisoners of War . . . .” U.S. Central Command Combined Forces Land Com-
ponent Commander, The Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, http://www.hrw.org/re-
ports/2003/usa1203/11.htm#_Toc57442300 (last visited July 14 2007).  Note that the
document reproduced at this source, although described as “Rules of Engagement,” is
actually only the “soldier’s card,” a summary of the essential rules printed on a small
laminated card and distributed to all U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel
deployed in Iraq.
89 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
90 Id. art. 5.
91 Id. art. 118.
92 See GREEN, supra note  28 at 210.
93 Id. at 102–14.
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retical gap between the law in international and non-international
armed conflicts becomes an acute problem of practical application.
We thus return to the fundamental problem highlighted in the in-
troduction to this article.94
A. Contemporary perspectives (I): the US, Israel, the UK and the
“Global War on Terror” as an armed conflict
Within six months of each other in the second half of 2006,
the Supreme Courts of two of the countries most actively engaged
in military operations against terrorist organizations handed down
decisions in which they addressed the fundamental issues of
whether those military operations amounted to an armed conflict,
in the international law sense of the term, and if so, the nature of
that conflict.  One of the decisions was concerned with what might
be termed the strictly humanitarian side of humanitarian law,
namely, the treatment of detainees captured by U.S. forces and
held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  The other decision dealt with a
specific issue in the context of the conduct of hostilities—methods
and means of warfare or the technical “rules of the game” as be-
tween opposing belligerents—namely, the Israeli practice of carry-
ing out “targeted killings” or “assassinations” (the precise
terminology adopted depends on whether one agrees with the
practice or not) against Palestinian militants in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.  The decisions form an interesting pair and contrast
quite sharply with each other since, in effect, the two courts arrived
at quite different conclusions.  It is important to remember, how-
ever, that they were actually considering different aspects of the
scenario, for all their apparent similarity: the U.S. decision pro-
duced a sweeping statement of the law applicable in the “Global
War on Terror” as a whole, whereas the Israeli court’s concern was
limited to one specific theatre of operations.
On June 29, 2006, in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,95 the
U.S. Supreme Court gave its long-anticipated decision on the legal-
ity of the procedures designated for the Military Commissions es-
tablished by President Bush for the prosecution of foreign
nationals captured in the “War on Terror.”96 This debate, which
had been pursued with avid interest among specialists and non-
specialists alike for nearly five years and generated an enormous
94 See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
95 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
96 Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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amount of legal literature,97 was not per se really about interna-
tional law at all.  Rather, it was about the President’s constitutional
authority to create such Commissions in the manner and form that
were used.  The discussion of whether defendants’ rights were be-
ing violated largely centered on whether they had any remedies
under U.S. law or any residual protections under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.  Within the parameters of this debate, the controversy over
the detainees’ international law status was initially secondary, as it
was only started subsequent to the President’s 2002 determination
that Geneva Convention III was not applicable to Taliban and al
Qaeda detainees captured in Afghanistan.98  However, it rapidly ac-
quired a notoriety all of its own, parallel to that of the Military
Commissions themselves, and generated even more legal literature
in international (as well as U.S.) circles.99
Salim Ahmed Hamdan is a Yemeni citizen who was detained
by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, where he had apparently been work-
ing as a driver, in November 2001.  Incarcerated at Guantánamo
Bay, he was charged in July 2004 with conspiracy to commit the
offenses of attacking civilians and civilian objects, murder and de-
struction of property by an unprivileged belligerent, and terror-
ism.100  In particular, it was alleged that he became Osama Bin
Laden’s personal driver and bodyguard, in which capacity he alleg-
97 E.g., Daryl A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.  320 (2002);
Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantánamo Bay
Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591 (2002); Jesselyn A.  Radack, You Say Defen-
dant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United
States and the Need for Due Process, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525 (2005).
98 See 151 CONG. REC. S12, 657–58 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman).
99 The literature on this topic is vast, so the following is only a representative sam-
ple: George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combat-
ants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891 (2002); Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational
Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror,” 44
HARV. INT’L L.J. 301 (2003); Lieutenant Colonel (s) Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, Al-
Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency and the International
Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2004); John C. Yoo, The Status of Soldiers and
Terrorists Under the Geneva Conventions, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 135 (2004); Derek Jinks,
The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367 (2004); Marco Sassòli,
The Status of Persons Held in Guantánamo Under International Humanitarian Law, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 96 (2004); Luisa Vierucci, Is the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War
Obsolete? The Views of the Counsel to the U.S. President on the Application of International Law
to the Afghan Conflict, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 866 (2004); Joseph Blocher, Combatant
Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667 (2006).
100 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Comm’n Complete Changes Against Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040714hcc.pdf (last visited
July 7, 2007).
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edly collected and delivered weapons and other supplies, pur-
chased trucks and served as a driver for Bin Laden and other high-
ranking members of al Qaeda.101 After having been labeled an un-
privileged belligerent subject to trial by Military Commission,102
Hamdan applied for habeas corpus relief.
Nowhere in its opinion did the Supreme Court address the
existence of an armed conflict as a matter of any uncertainty, much
less one of dispute; it is at the very least implicit in the opinion of
the plurality, the concurring, and the dissenting opinions that
there is, in fact, an armed conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda.
Indeed, the very parameters of the argument—suggesting that
Hamdan be considered as a prisoner of war—indicate that the
court accepted a presupposition of the factual existence of an
armed conflict.  The opinion of the Court expressly uses the terms
“hostilities,”103 “active combat,”104 “armed conflict,” and “war”105 in
such a way as to suggest that it never entered the Justices’ heads to
consider whether there really was an armed conflict in the interna-
tional law sense at all.  Justice Kennedy, concurring, referred to
“our Nation’s armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda—a
conflict that continues as we speak.”106 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Thomas stated that the government’s position was “sup-
ported by the nature of the present conflict.  We are not engaged
in a traditional battle with a nation-state, but with a worldwide, hy-
dra-headed enemy . . . .”107 He also referred to the “ongoing
war.”108 The comments made by the plurality and by Justice
Thomas, in his dissenting opinion, as to the applicability of Geneva
Convention III shed some light on the nature of the conflict, which
is the next issue to be considered,109 but that there was a conflict,
no one doubted.
Half a world and half a year away from the Supreme Court in
101 Id.
102 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Office of the Chief Prosecutor, Office of Military Def., Memo-
randum for Detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan 0149: Notification of the Swearing Charges, Feb.
2, 2007, ¶ 2–3, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d2007Hamdan%20-%20Notifica-
tion%20of%20Sworn%20Charges.pdf (citing the “final determination of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal of 3 October 2004” that Hamdan is an unlawful enemy com-
batant as a member of, or affiliated with, al Qaeda, and stating that the accused’s
charged conduct is subject to trial by military commission).
103 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2753.
104 Id. at 2760.
105 Id. at 2757.
106 Id. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 2839.
109 See infra text accompanying notes 124–54.
462 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:435
Washington, the Supreme Court of Israel gave quite a different de-
cision in the case of Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov-
ernment of Israel.110 This case originated in a petition to the
Supreme Court, in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, chal-
lenging the legality of the policy of “targeted frustration of terror-
ism,” whereby individual members of terrorist organizations who
are believed to be involved in the planning, launching, or execu-
tion of terrorist attacks against Israeli targets are killed in targeted
strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).  The policy has been the
subject of considerable academic debate for a number of years,111
both as to the legal and ethical principles involved and the practi-
cal effects of execution of the policy (the IDF strikes have often
resulted in substantial collateral damage to Palestinian civilians
and civilian objects).  The petition—which was originally submitted
in January 2002 during an escalation in violence in the context of
the second or Al-Aqsa intifada, which had begun in September
2000—was set aside by the Supreme Court when the Government
of Israel unilaterally decided to suspend operation of the policy in
light of possible developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace pro-
cess in February 2005.  With the renewed escalation of violence in
June 2005, however, the State resumed its implementation of the
policy, with the result that the case was once again placed on the
Court’s active list.112
110 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006].
111 Alongside the Israeli context, the literature has also focused on the same policy
as conducted by the U.S. since September 11, 2001. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Kendall,
Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1069 (2002); Joshua Raines, Osama, Augustine and Assassination: The Just War Doctrine
and Targeted Killings, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2002); William C.
Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S.  Legal Frame-
work, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667 (2003); Louis René Beres, The Newly Expanded American
Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination?, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157
(2002–2003); Robert F. Turner, It’s not Really “Assassination”: Legal and Moral Implica-
tions of Intentionally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV.  787 (2002); Chris Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’ in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the
Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 277 (2004); Jonathan Ulrich, The Gloves Were
Never on: Defining the President’s Authority to Order Targeted Killings in the War Against
Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1029 (2005); Vincent-Joël Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If
the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing
of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2005); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of
Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 171 (2005); Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the
Legality of Assassination as a Tool of U.S.  Foreign Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 677 (2005); Daniel
Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (2006).
112 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], ¶ 14.
On the fate of a previous petition along the same lines, see id. ¶ 9; Kretzmer, supra
note 111 at n.7.
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As with the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan, it was common
ground before the Israeli Supreme Court that IDF actions against
Palestinian militant organizations were taking place within the
framework of an armed conflict.  Both petitioners and the State
acknowledged this in their pleadings, although both parties
showed somewhat more subtlety and inventiveness in their argu-
ments than was apparent in Hamdan.  The petitioners suggested
that, “within [the] framework [of the armed conflict], military acts
to which the laws of war apply are not allowed” and argued that,
the practice employed by states fighting terrorism unequivocally
indicates international custom, according to which members of
terrorist organizations are treated as criminals, and the penal
law, supplemented at times with special emergency powers, is
the law which controls the ways [in which] the struggle against
terrorism is conducted.113
The U.K.’s example in dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland
was cited as a case in point.114 The State argued in response that,
there is no longer any doubt that an armed conflict can exist
between a state and groups and organizations which are not
states.  That is due, inter alia, to the military ability means which
such organizations have, as well as their willingness to use them.
The current conflict between Israel and the terrorist organiza-
tions is an armed conflict, in the framework of which Israel is
permitted to use military means.115
The Court, for its part, had no trouble at all accepting, “[t]he gen-
eral, principled starting point . . . that between Israel and the vari-
ous terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza
Strip . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since
the first intifada,” citing an earlier judgment to the effect that the
“severe combat” taking place in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ries “is not police activity.  It is an armed conflict.”116  Much more
controversy centered on the nature of the armed conflict, but the
Court’s acceptance of this “starting point” makes sense in light of
113 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], ¶ 4.
114 Id.
115 Id. ¶ 11.  This approach had consistently been reflected in Israel’s statements to
the United Nations. See U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human
Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Sum-
mary Executions, 130–31, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006) (Report
of Special Rapporteur, Philip Allston).
116 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], ¶ 16,
(citing HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander, [2002], ¶ 1).  Note that in the English
translation of the Hebrew original in Ajuri, the phrases “fierce fighting” and “armed
struggle” replace “severe combat” and “armed conflict,” although the sense is clearly
identical.
464 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:435
the duration and intensity of much of the combat since September
2000.  To this extent, the petitioners’ comparison of the situation
to Northern Ireland seems misplaced: at no time did the IRA en-
gage the British security forces with the regularity and consistency
of the various Palestinian armed groups.117  The penal law is un-
doubtedly one way in which terrorism may be combated, but mili-
tary measures may also be appropriate, depending on the severity
of the situation.  In this respect the State’s argument was entirely
correct.
There is no comparable judicial decision from the U.K. as to
the general parameters of the “War on Terror” or its status as an
armed conflict or otherwise, as no similar cases have been brought
in the British courts.  The U.K. does not have an extraterritorial
detention facility comparable to Guantánamo Bay, and persons
temporarily detained by British forces in theaters of operations in
the “War on Terror”—principally Afghanistan and Iraq, which the
U.K. formally considers to be “military operations abroad that do
not amount to International Armed Conflict118 . . . must be handed
over to the [Host Nation] authorities as soon as practicable in or-
der that detainees can be dealt with according to the local criminal
justice system.”119 The U.K. does not engage in assassinations or
targeted killings as a method of dealing with terrorists overseas (al-
though it accepts that assassination may be lawful in the context of
military operations, subject to certain conditions),120 while within
the national territory the prevalent approach is always sequestra-
tion of assets, arrest and prosecution under the ordinary criminal
law.121
Generally the approach of the U.K. authorities is to be as
vague as possible concerning the legal classification of military op-
erations in which British forces are engaged, and to concentrate
instead on the legal basis for such operations.  Thus, for instance,
statements from the British Ministry of Defence on the deployment
117 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
118 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION: DETAINEES, 2006, JDP
1–10.3, ¶ 101.
119 Id. ¶ 116.
120 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, ¶ 5.13
(2004).  Notwithstanding this approach, the U.K. position on Israel’s use of targeted
killings is that they are contrary to international law. See, e.g., 675 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) (2005) WA23.
121 The principal legislative authorities for such procedures are: the Terrorism Act,
2000, c. 11 (U.K.); The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.);
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.); and the Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11
(U.K.).  None of these relate in any way to military operations.
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and use of British troops in Afghanistan do not refer to their par-
ticipation in an armed conflict in that country, merely to the fact
that they are present as part of the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), with a brief to aid reconstruction under the
seal of approval of the U.N. Security Council.122 The deployment
and use of British forces in Iraq since the end of the period of
belligerent occupation in June 2004 is likewise stated to be on the
legal basis of a mandate from the U.N. Security Council;123 again
there is no reference to any state of armed conflict in Iraq today.
The general position in the U.K. is that the determination of a
state of armed conflict is a policy decision to be made by the gov-
ernment; it “depends upon the status of the parties to the conflict,
and the nature of the hostilities.”124  Within the context of the
“Global War on Terror,” thus, each individual situation needs to be
examined separately on the basis of its own facts—the actors and
the nature of the hostilities—to determine if it amounts to an
armed conflict or not.125  The concept of the entirety of the “War
on Terror” as a global phenomenon, in all its multifarious aspects,
being tantamount to an armed conflict of any kind in the sense of
international law is completely unknown to British law and
doctrine.
122 E.g., Adam Ingram, Minister of State, Speech to the All-Party Parliamentary
Army Group: U.K. Military Operations in Afghanistan (Oct. 24 2006), available at
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/MinAF/Uk
MilitaryOperationsInAfghanistan.htm, U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, OPERATIONS IN AF-
GHANISTAN: BACKGROUND BRIEFING 2, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Fact
Sheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBackgroundBriefing2.htm
(last visited July 7, 2007).
123 The Queen (on the application of Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State
for Defence, [2006] EWCA Civ. 327 (regarding a challenge to the legality of indefinite
detention without charge of a British–Iraqi dual national by British forces in Iraq
since October 2004).
124 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION: PRISONERS OF WAR, INTERN-
EES AND DETAINEES, 2006, JDP 1–10 ¶ 403.
125 In an extradition case in recent years, a U.K. judge was faced with a Russian
claim that the situation in Chechnya in 1995–1996 “amounted to a riot and rebellion,
‘banditry’ and terrorism.”  It was held, however, that “the events in Chechnya . . .
amounted in law to an internal armed conflict.”  In support of that determination,
the judge listed the following factors: “the scale of the fighting —the intense carpet
bombing of Grozny within excess of 100,000 casualties, the recognition of the conflict
in terms of a cease-fire and a peace treaty.” The Government of the Russian Federation v.
Akhmed Zakaev, Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, Decision of Judge T. Workman, Nov.
13, 2003, available at http://www.tjetjenien.org/Bowstreetmag.htm.
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B. Contemporary perspectives (II): the US, Israel, the UK and the
“Global War on Terror” as an international or non-
international armed conflict
In its decision on the final appeal in Hamdan, the Supreme
Court, in considering the legality of the Military Commission estab-
lished to try him, addressed inter alia the applicability of the Ge-
neva Conventions to his case in light of the nature of the “Global
War on Terror” as an armed conflict—a point that had been ar-
gued in both the first instance126 and previous appellate127 deci-
sions.  The district court had dismissed the government’s claim
that there were two separate armed conflicts in Afghanistan—one
between the United States and the Taliban, and one between the
United States and al Qaeda—and that, Hamdan having been cap-
tured in the course of the second one, Geneva Convention III did
not apply to him.128  The district court had held that,
the government’s attempt to separate the Taliban from al
Queda for Geneva Convention purposes finds no support in the
structure of the Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the
place of the conflict, and not by what particular faction a fighter is asso-
ciated with . . . . Thus . . . the Third Geneva Convention applies to
all persons detained in Afghanistan during the hostilities
there.129
The court of appeals had then reversed the district court, holding
that the Geneva Convention was not judicially enforceable in U.S.
federal courts;130 and that in any event for the purposes of the Ge-
neva Conventions the armed conflict in Afghanistan was effectively
neither international nor non-international in nature.  On the one
hand al Qaeda was neither a State nor a “High Contracting Party”
to the Convention (as required by Common Article 2 thereof).  On
the other, the conflict was not confined to the territory of “a single
country” (as required by Common Article 3 as interpreted), but
was “international in scope,” as determined by the President,
whose constitutional authority to make such a determination had
126 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
127 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
128 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 160.
129 Id. at 161 (emphasis added).  In my analysis, although the Judge’s ultimate con-
clusion on this point was correct, his reason was wrong: it is not the geographical
location of a conflict that determines the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, but
the identity of the parties.  In this sense the U.S. administration was not in my opinion
wrong ab initio to differentiate between Taliban and al Qaeda; they should have
respected Article 5 of Geneva Convention III and treated al Qaeda detainees as if they
were POWs until a competent tribunal decided otherwise.
130 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39–40.
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to be judicially respected.131
The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, finding con-
clusively that, as to the generalities of the case, the Military Com-
missions in the form in which they had been created by President
Bush were illegally established and did not conform procedurally
to the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.132
For the purposes of this discussion, the most interesting part of the
Supreme Court’s decision was the passage in which the plurality
addressed the conformity of the Military Commissions to the re-
quirements of the Geneva Conventions.  The opinion, as written by
Justice Stevens, declared that it was not necessary to deal with the
merits of the government’s argument (on the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions) that had been so successful in the Appeals
Court, “because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Con-
ventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one
between signatories.”133 This the plurality identified as Common
Article 3, which applies as a “minimum yardstick” of protection in
all conflicts134 but prima facie is directed specifically to “armed con-
flicts not of an international character,” in which it provides basic
protections to persons taking no active part in hostilities, including
those placed hors de combat by wounds or sickness and those who
have surrendered or been otherwise detained.135  The key to this
part of the decision, for the plurality, was the phrase “conflict not
of an international character.”  This, the Court held to have a
meaning “in contradistinction to a conflict between nations,” or,
effectively a negative definition of the phrase, such that it could be
interpreted as bringing within its ambit any and all armed conflicts
that do not fit within the inter-State armed conflict paradigm.  The
plurality asserted that this was the “literal meaning” of the phrase,
and that in any event the intention behind the provision, whilst
ostensibly restricted specifically to non-international armed con-
flicts stricto sensu, was for its scope of application to be “as wide as
possible.”136  Of the dissenting opinions, only that of Justice
Thomas dealt directly with the issue of the nature of the conflict.
He held that “[t]he conflict with al Queda is international in char-
131 Id. at 41.
132 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2851.
133 Id. at 2756-2757.
134 The phrase is taken from the International Court of Justice’s famous decision in
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits) ¶
218. In Tadić, the ICTY also held that, “the character of the conflict is irrelevant” in
terms of the application of Common Article 3. Tadić, supra note 73, ¶ 102.
135 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
136 Id. at 2796 (quoting Geneva Conventions Commentary 36–37).
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acter in the sense that it is occurring in various nations around the
globe.  Thus, it is also ‘occurring in the territory of’ more than
‘one of the High Contracting Parties.’”137  Although he described
the plurality’s interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “armed
conflict not of an international character” as “admittedly plausi-
ble,” he nevertheless felt constrained by the judicial duty of defer-
ence to the Executive’s determination of the matter.138 The
plurality departed spectacularly from that presumption of defer-
ence, given that the administration has tended to take the explicit
line that the conflict was international in character.139
The plurality in the U.S. Supreme Court thus identified the
totality of the “Global War on Terror” as an “armed conflict not of
an international character” within the meaning of Common Article
3. The decision proceeded from an essentially functionalist per-
spective—the necessity to decide the legality of President Bush’s
Military Commissions—and applied a literalist reading of the letter
of the law.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Israeli counterpart, consid-
ering a much more limited scenario—namely, IDF actions against
Palestinian militants in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and
areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority—applied
a much more holistic approach in seeking to explain the whole
legal framework underpinning IDF operations in this theater, and
reached the diametrically opposite conclusion: that the armed con-
flict between Israel and the Palestinian armed groups is an interna-
tional armed conflict.  This would have been thought by most
international lawyers (outside Israel, at least) to be counter-intui-
tive: the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians cannot be in-
ternational in nature because the Palestinians are not a State in
international law.  Conversely, nor could it have been considered a
non-international armed conflict, since some parts of the Palestin-
ian Territories are under belligerent occupation by Israel, whilst
other parts are under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority;
in neither case are they legally part of the State of Israel.140  But
even if those views were correct, it could never be the position that
the conflict was subject to no rules of humanitarian law at all.
137 Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 2846.
139 E.g., John Bellinger III, U.S. Department of State, Oral Statements by the United
States Delegation to the Committee Against Torture, at 4 (May 8, 2006), http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/66173.pdf.
140 Although, for an interesting argument to the contrary, see Kretzmer, supra note
111 (suggesting that this conflict be regarded as being of mixed character, neither
fully international nor fully non-international).
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Probably the default position would then have been to fall back on
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as the U.S. Su-
preme Court did.
The classification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was initially
a point of agreement between the petitioners and the State of
Israel, but both sides modified aspects of their submissions on
point as the case proceeded.  The petitioners made the obscurant-
ist suggestion that, “the conflict under discussion is an interna-
tional armed conflict, however . . . within its framework, military
acts to which the laws of war apply are not allowed”141—a point of
which it is hard to make any particular sense.  The State, on the
other hand, shifted its legal position from simply saying that the
conflict was international in nature, “to which the usual laws of war
apply,”142 to claiming that:
the question of the classification of the conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians is a complicated question, with characteris-
tics that point in different directions.  In any case, there is no
need to decide that question in order to decide the petition.
That is because according to all of the classifications [of armed
conflict], the laws of armed conflict will apply to the acts of the
State.  These laws allow striking at persons who are party to the
armed conflict and take an active part in it, whether it is an in-
ternational or a non-international armed conflict, and even if it
belongs to a new category of armed conflict which has been de-
veloping over the last decade in international law—a category of
armed conflicts between states and terrorist organizations.  Ac-
cording to each of these categories, a person who is party to the
armed conflict and takes an active part in it is a combatant, and
it is permissible to strike at him.143
The State’s argument at this point is extremely interesting, as it
amounted to saying that many of the rules in armed conflicts are
now the same, irrespective of the classification of the conflict in
question.  This is a tendency that has been gathering apace in the
last twelve years, and is evidenced by the jurisprudence of interna-
tional criminal tribunals (notably the ICTY)144 as well as the prac-
tice of States as expressed in their military law manuals and
instructions.145  To the extent that the State of Israel expressed the
141 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], ¶ 4.
142 Id. ¶ 11.
143 Id.
144 See Turns, supra note 85, at 127–31.
145 E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. Directive No. 5100.77, Dec. 9, 1998, ¶ 5.3.1 (U.S. person-
nel are required to “comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however
such conflicts are characterized . . . .”); German Central Service Manual, ZDv 15/2 ¶
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same view, through its legal counsel in this litigation, it could
clearly be viewed as another example of the accumulation of opinio
juris on this point.
The Court did not choose to go down the particular path that
the State’s submissions opened for them on the character of the
armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.  It ruled simply
that the applicable law was that governing international armed
conflicts, and it did so on two distinct grounds: (1) the fact of the
armed conflict crossing the frontiers of the State and taking place
within a context of belligerent occupation (which by definition
constitutes international armed conflict);146 and (2) the military
capabilities of modern terrorist organizations.  The latter point,
which would seem to be of rather more general application than
just to the specific situation with which the Court was dealing, is an
innovative view, which the Court expressed in the following terms:
the fact that the terrorist organizations and their members do
not act in the name of a state does not turn the struggle against
them into a purely internal state conflict. . . . Indeed, in today’s
reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have considerable mil-
itary capabilities.  At times they have military capabilities that ex-
ceed those of states.  Confrontation with those dangers cannot
be restricted within the state and its penal law.  Confronting the
dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of the international law
dealing with armed conflicts of international character.147
The decisions of the U.S. and Israeli Supreme Courts in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld and Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel, respectively, represent two alternative classifications of the
“Global War on Terror” as an armed conflict.  While the common
sense analysis adopted by the Israeli court is commendable, the
American approach seems rather literalist by comparison.  Never-
theless, it could signal a resurgence of importance and usefulness
for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  The perceived
vagueness, generality, and lack of enforceability of that provision
211, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 48 (Di-
eter Fleck ed., 1999), (“German soldiers like their Allies are required to comply with
the rules of international humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations in
all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized.”). See Turns, supra note
85, at 139–41.  U.K. doctrine does not go so far in its acceptance of the trend, but
does expressly provide for the use of the provisions of Additional Protocol I (which
on the face of it is applicable to international armed conflicts only) for targeting
operations, “[w]hether a state of international armed conflict exists or not.”  U.K.
Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication—Legal Support to Joint Operations, Apr.
2005, JWP 3-46, ¶ 221.
146 HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006], ¶ 18.
147 Id. ¶ 21.
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were largely what prompted the drafting of Additional Protocol II
in 1977, an instrument which in turn became quasi-impossible to
apply in practice because of the extremely high threshold for its
scope of application—along with the fact that most States with non-
international armed conflicts in their territories studiously avoided
signature or ratification.  What is innovative about the decision in
Hamdan is its application of Common Article 3 to a transnational
armed conflict—meaning one that crosses international fron-
tiers—that is nevertheless not primarily one between States.  In this
context, Common Article 3 is viewed as a fundamental baseline or
“lowest common denominator,”148 which in any event was always
intended by its drafters to have the widest scope of application pos-
sible,149 and which has been acknowledged as applying to all armed
conflicts.150
The Israeli decision is seductive in the clarity and logic of its
analysis, but it is quite clear that the Court there was only classify-
ing the situation as between Israel and armed militants operating
from the Occupied Palestinian Territories and areas under the ju-
risdiction of the Palestinian Authority.  Nevertheless, the passage
148 For a similar argument, developed in much more detail, see the interesting dis-
cussion in Geoffrey S. Corn, “Snipers in the Minaret—What Is the Rule?”  The Law of War
and the Protection of Cultural Property: A Complex Equation, 2005 ARMY LAW. 28, DA PAM
27-50-386, n.27.  Corn argues cogently for a pragmatic characterization of military
operations by States against non-State transnational terrorist elements as either “sim-
ply ‘armed conflicts’” or transnational armed conflicts, reflecting the global reach of
such operations.  Such characterization would trigger the application of the basic
principles of military necessity and humanity (the latter as reflected in Common Arti-
cle 3 and Additional Protocol II) as a matter of customary international law.  There is
much to commend this analysis: in its application of Common Article 3, at least, it
uses principles of humanitarian law on which there is universal agreement, while si-
multaneously respecting the peculiar characteristics of such conflicts.
149 See JEAN DE PREUX, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY
III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 36 (A.P.
de Heney trans., 1960).  In fact, this commentary is sufficiently ambivalent as to be
potentially useful to either side of an argument as to the applicability of Common
Article 3 to transnational armed conflicts by States against terrorist elements.  On the
one hand, it is stated as applying “to non-international armed conflicts only.” Id. at
34. This is a phrase which in the modern understanding is narrower than the phrase
“armed conflicts not of an international character,” contained in the text of the Arti-
cle itself.  On the other hand, one of the criteria suggested for distinguishing a genu-
ine armed conflict from mere “acts of banditry,” id. at 36, or an unorganized and
short-lived insurrection is “that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the
Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to
international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.” Id.  The latter
criterion was satisfied, in the case of the U.S. response to the attacks of September 11,
2001, by Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001).
150 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(merits).
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quoted above from the opinion of the Court suggests that a
broader, more sweeping statement of law might have been in-
tended.  The only other counter-terrorist operations in which the
IDF has been engaged in recent years have been against Hezbollah
in Lebanon—a situation that in July and August 2006 undoubtedly
escalated into full-scale armed conflict.  Official Israeli publications
related to that conflict refer to international humanitarian law ex-
clusively in terms of the law applicable in international armed con-
flict.151 Likewise, it was the position of the IDF that “decisions were
taken on the basis of the law on international armed conflicts, in
particular the Geneva Convention [IV], and those provisions of the
Additional Protocol I that are declaratory of customary interna-
tional law.”152 In any event, an argument could be made that as
Hezbollah was part of the coalition government in Lebanon at the
time, conceivably the conflict was in some sense directed against
the Lebanese state.153 The extraterritorial dimension of the con-
flict in Lebanon—as compared to IDF operations in areas that are
either under Israeli belligerent occupation or under the jurisdic-
tion of the autonomous (but not independent in terms of state-
hood) Palestinian Authority—would be another obvious reason to
argue for the international character of the conflict.  As far as the
characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as international is
concerned, however, inasmuch as it relates to IDF operations being
carried out in areas that are not under Israeli belligerent occupa-
tion, the obvious criticism from an international law perspective is
that that conflict is not between two or more States.
As far as British practice and doctrine are concerned, any de-
termination as to the type of armed conflict must be done on a
case-by-case basis, depending on the facts in each given situa-
tion.154 The legal basis of the decision in any event, for the U.K.
authorities, will be the international law definitions of interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts, in conjunction with
the facts on the ground.  If British forces are in action against the
government or other official forces of any other State, the situation
will be classified as one of international armed conflict—a decision
151 E.g., Press Release, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Responding to Hezbollah
attacks from Lebanon—Issues of Proportionality (July 25, 2006) (on file with the
author).
152 See U.N. General Assembly, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution
60/351 of 15 March 2006 entitled “Human Rights Council”, 23, U.N. Doc A/HRC/2/
7 (Oct. 2, 2006) (Report of Mission to Lebanon and Israel).
153 This argument was not made officially by Israel.
154 See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 120, ¶¶ 3.1–3.13.
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made all the easier by the fact that every State in the world is now a
High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions.  In any other
situation in which British troops are deployed, the situation will be
regarded as one of de facto non-international armed conflict.
Thus, from the point of view of the U.K., the ongoing hostilities in
Afghanistan and Iraq are in effect treated as internal conflicts in
which U.K. forces are participating on the side of the governments
of those States.  The conflict in Iraq, for example, is not one be-
tween the British and Iraqi States; it is between Iraqi insurgents
and the Iraqi State, and the latter (with the sanction of the U.N.
Security Council) invited British troops to assist them in combating
the insurgency and maintaining or restoring law and order.  This
position might seem counter-intuitive: how can forces of one State
be engaged in hostilities in another State, against foreign nationals,
yet the conflict not be regarded as an international one?  However,
the position is in fact not devoid of sense from a strictly legal per-
spective, in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdan has a certain logic to it.  If the British and Iraqi States are
not at war with each other, but there is a conflict going on in Iraq,
it cannot be international according to the definitions in the Ge-
neva Conventions or Additional Protocol I.  Therefore, by default
almost, it must be not international, or effectively internal.  Whether
it is then governed by Common Article 3 or by Additional Protocol
II will depend, as far as the British authorities are concerned, on
whether the non-State party to the conflict is fighting under re-
sponsible command, has control of territory, and is able to imple-
ment the Protocol.155 Again, this will be a policy decision made by
the Government.156
SOME CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS AN ACCEPTABLE
COMPROMISE ON THE APPLICABLE LAW?
Is the “Global War on Terror” an armed conflict or not?  And,
if it is, what kind of armed conflict is it for the purposes of the
application of humanitarian law?  This Article presents the views
adopted in recent decisions by the highest courts in the U.S. and
Israel, alongside a comparative perspective from the U.K., in-
formed by the historical experience of dealing with terrorist insur-
gency in Northern Ireland.  I would suggest that there are six
options:
155 Art. 1(1), Additional Protocol II.
156 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 120, ¶¶ 4.3.3–4.3.4.
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(i) there is a conflict and it is international in nature, as indi-
cated by the Supreme Court of Israel;
(ii) there is a conflict and it is non-international in nature, as
indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court;
(iii) there is a conflict with a new kind of hybrid status, which
might be described as a trans-national armed conflict, as
suggested by Corn;157
(iv) there is a conflict and its precise classification in terms of
humanitarian law does not really matter, as long as the
“minimum yardstick” of Common Article 3, which is appli-
cable as a minimum in all armed conflicts, is used to govern
States’ and soldiers’ behavior when conducting military op-
erations against terrorist non-State actors;
(v) there is no overarching conflict: the various counter-terror-
ist military operations which have taken place since Sep-
tember 2001 should be viewed as primarily criminal law
enforcement operations undertaken with military support;
and
(vi) there is no overarching conflict, but each individual
counter-terrorist military operation in the context of the
“War on Terror” should be designated separately as either
international or non-international in nature, in accordance
with international humanitarian law and depending on the
facts on the ground.
Each of these possibilities has advantages and disadvantages.
If option (i) is adopted, that would entail an obligation to apply
the full corpus of the law of international armed conflicts—at a
minimum, the four Geneva Conventions and the customary law of
international armed conflict, together with those provisions of Ad-
ditional Protocol I that are accepted as having attained customary
status (for States that have not ratified Protocol I) or the entirety of
the Protocol for States that are parties thereto.  The question of
personal status is of crucial importance in international armed con-
flicts: are individual fighters legally combatants?  Are they prisoners
of war upon capture?  Therefore, some agreement would need to
be reached about the status to be accorded to terrorists captured
by troops on the battlefield.  The U.S. and the U.K., the two closest
coalition partners in the “War on Terror,” fundamentally disagree
about this.  The Americans consider such detainees to be “unlawful
combatants,” a category which the U.K. does not recognize as le-
gally valid.158 The preferred British position would be to regard
157 Corn, supra note 148 at 32.
158 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION: DETAINEES, 2006, JDP 1–10,
¶¶ 110–11.
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such persons as basically civilians who have lost their entitlement to
special protection under Geneva Convention IV by virtue of having
illegally taken part in hostilities.159  These individuals may be
targeted as legitimate hostile military targets, and upon capture are
entitled to treatment according to the “fundamental guarantees”
specified in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I (but not as prison-
ers of war under Geneva Convention III).160  For my part, I would
suggest that there is not necessarily any harm in according combat-
ant—and, therefore, prisoner of war—status, on a de facto basis, to
terrorists captured in the “War on Terror.”  On the contrary, doing
so would send an important message about the values and the in-
trinsic humaneness of our societies.  However, because of the per-
ception that it would give terrorists a privileged legal status and
rights to which they technically should not be entitled, and because
of the reciprocal basis of the law of armed conflict (a conception of
hostilities that is not generally shared by the terrorist organiza-
tions), it is unlikely in the extreme that there would be agreement
on such a position.161 But there should be no objection in logic to
treating captured terrorists, at the very least, as if they were POWs
until a competent tribunal has properly determined their status:
that would ensure compliance with both the letter and the spirit of
Article 5 of Geneva Convention III.
Options (ii) and (iii) share a similar problem that differenti-
ates between them primarily as a question of degree.  In the event
of the law of non-international armed conflicts being applied, an
immediate difficulty is that there is not very much of it.  What pro-
visions exist are vague, of the utmost generality, and overwhelm-
ingly concerned with the protection of victims, but not with
methods and means of warfare.  In order for Additional Protocol II
to be applicable, the State in question would have to be a party
thereto—ruling out its application by U.S. or Israeli forces, for ex-
ample—and the high threshold for scope of application in its Arti-
cle 1(1) would have to be satisfied.  This is rarely the case for
159 Id. ¶ 111.
160 See JEAN–MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD–BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I: RULES 299–383 (Rules 87–105) (2005).
161 There would also be potential problems in the application of various technical
provisions of Geneva Convention III vis-à-vis captured terrorists qua POWs. E.g., the
requirements not to transfer POWs from the Detaining Power to another High Con-
tracting Party (art. 12), to give advances of pay to POWs according to rank (art. 60),
and to release and repatriate POWs “without delay after the cessation of active hostili-
ties” (art. 118). Although special agreements to deal with these and other matters
might be concluded in accordance with Article 6, the complications inherent in such
a procedure would be likely to deter States from seeking to effect them.
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terrorist organizations.  If only Common Article 3 could be said to
be applicable, then option (ii) effectively merges with option (iv).
Even if Additional Protocol II did apply to a non-international
armed conflict with terrorists, there would be a dearth of applica-
ble law relating to methods and means of warfare.  For example,
what weapons may one use or not use in a non-international armed
conflict with terrorists?  With option (iii), the problem would lie in
knowing which specific provisions, from a much greater corpus of
law, to apply.  Should the law of international armed conflict be
applied, so as to afford the highest level of protection and stan-
dards of conduct possible?  Although that sounds attractive in the-
ory, in practice States would surely oppose it for the same reasons
that they would oppose option (i).
Option (iv) sounds superficially attractive.  Since there is uni-
versal agreement about the scope and application of Common Arti-
cle 3, every State in the world accepts it, and there is judicial
authority from the highest court in international law that it is the
basis of humanitarian protection in all conflicts,162 there would
seem to be minimal problems in applying it to conflicts with terror-
ist organizations.  But again, the devil is in the detail.  This option
avoids hard choices based on rigorous analysis, and Common Arti-
cle 3 is completely silent as to aspects of warfare other than protec-
tion of victims.163  In this respect, one might legitimately ask: is
Common Article 3 enough?
Finally, options (v) and (vi) represent British practice, the for-
mer in relation to earlier “emergencies” such as those in Malaya
and Northern Ireland,164 the latter in relation to current doctrine.
Although imperfect, the current British perspective on legal classi-
fication of, and application of rules in, individual military opera-
tions in the “War on Terror” does at least have the benefit of
flexibility and adaptability.  It preserves the prerogatives and privi-
leges of States’ forces without extending them to those who are not
162 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), supra note 150.
163 As mentioned above, the same is true of Additional Protocol II and the custom-
ary law of non-international armed conflict.  But at least since the ICTY decision in
Tadić, supra note 73, there has been a developing tendency to extend the application
of many customary rules regarding methods and means of warfare in international
armed conflicts to cover non-international armed conflicts also. See Turns, supra note
85.
164 Although, for a critical view of the “militarization phase” in Northern Ireland
and its implications, see Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, A Model for the ‘War Against
Terrorism’? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew, 30 J. L. &
SOC. 341 (2003).
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entitled to them, while nevertheless enabling the most humanita-
rian treatment possible of captured terrorists.
International humanitarian law has itself been suffering from
all the uncertainty surrounding its interpretation and application
since September 2001.  I am of the view that there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with the rules themselves: rewriting them is not neces-
sary, and probably not practicable in any event.  What is needed is
some agreement and consistency as to what existing law to use in
relation to military counter-terrorist operations.  Ultimately, talk of
“unlawful combatants” and even the use of the term “terrorists”
serve no useful legal purpose and should be abandoned in legal
discourse.  These terms are legally meaningless and only contrib-
ute to decreasing the incentives for mutual respect of the law.165
Such a regression to barbarism on the part of civilized nations is
the last thing the law needs in an already increasingly barbaric age.
165 It is at least heartening that the latest reissue of the U.S. Army Field Manual on
Human Intelligence Collector Operations incorporates reference to Common Article 3 as
the benchmark for a single humane standard of treatment for all detainees in military
custody, regardless of their status. See Dep’t of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) (Sept.
2006); Dep’t of Def. Directive 2310.01E ¶ 4.2 (Sept. 5, 2006).

